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The firmly established evidence of right-skewness of the firms’ size 
distribution is generally modelled recurring to some variant of the 
Gibrat’s Law of Proportional Effects. In spite of its empirical success, 
this approach has been harshly criticized on a theoretical ground 
due to its lack of economic contents and its unpleasant long-run 
implications. In this chapter we show that a right-skewed firms’ size 
distribution, with its upper tail scaling down as a power law, arises 
naturally from a simple choice-theoretic model based on financial 
market imperfections and a wage setting relationship. Our results 
rest on a multi-agent generalization of the prey-predator model, 
firstly introduced into economics by Richard Goodwin forty years 
ago.  
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1. Introduction 
Starting with the pioneering work of Gibrat (1931), the study of the 
determinants and the shape of the steady-state distribution of firms’ size has 
long fascinated economists. While the conventional view received from the 
seminal work of e.g. Hart and Prais (1956), Hart (1962) and Mansfield (1962) 
holds that the firms’ size distribution is significantly right-skewed and 
approximately log-normal, recent empirical research has lent support to the 
view suggested by H. Simon and his co-author (Ijiri and Simon, 1977), 
according to whom a Pareto-Levy (or power law) distribution seems to return 
a better fit to the data for the whole distribution (Axtell, 2001), or at least for 
its upper tail (Ramsden and Kiss-Haypal, 2000; Gaffeo et al., 2003).1   
Regardless of the different outcomes obtained from distribution-fitting 
exercises, the most popular explanation for right-skewness emerged so far in 
the literature rests on stochastic growth processes, basically because of their 
satisfactory performance in empirical modelling.2 From a theoretical point of 
view, however, random growth models of firms’ dynamics have been 
generally seen as far less satisfactory. On the one hand, several authors have 
simply discarded purely stochastic models as ad-hoc and uninformative, given 
that a proper theory of firms’ growth should be grounded on richer economic 
contents and maximizing rational behaviour (Sutton, 1997).3 Alas, the 
introduction of stochastic elements in standard maximizing, game-theoretic 
models4 has shown that their implications as regards the steady-state firms’ 
size distribution are highly dependent on initial assumptions and modelling 
choices, to the point that we cannot find “[…] any reason to expect the size 
distribution of firms to take any particular form for the general run of industries” 
                                                 
1 Another challenging stylized fact on the drivers of corporate growth and the resulting 
industrial structure is the ubiquitous exponential shape of the growth rates density (Bottazzi  
and Secchi, 2003; Bottazzi et al., 2007). 
2 For recent evidence, see Geroski et al. (2001), who point towards a pure random walk model 
for firms’ growth, and Hart and Oulton (2001), who instead suggest a Galtonian, reversion-to-
the-mean growth process. 
3 In spite of being very popular among economists, Sutton’s critique is not properly 
established. In fact, the Gibrat’s Law may be perfectly consistent with the behaviour of rational, 
profit-maximizing firms. In a nutshell, consider a model in which firms, à la Penrose (1959), are 
constrained in their growth opportunities only by their internal resources. Since firms’ size, at 
the optimum, depends on current expectations on future conditions, if firms form rational 
expectations changes in expectations will be unpredictable. This implies that growth rates are 
realizations of pure random processes. See e.g. Klette and Kortum (2004).  
4 See, for example, Jovanovic (1982) and Ericson and Pakes (1995).   3
(Sutton, 1997, p. 43).  On the other hand, the original Gibrat’s random 
multiplicative model (also known as the Law of proportionate effect) and its 
numerous extensions5 all share the unpleasant property of possessing either 
an implosive or an explosive behaviour under rather general conditions, so 
that their cross-section dynamics tend alternatively towards a degenerate 
firms’ size distribution with zero mean and variance or a degenerate 
distribution with infinite mean and variance (Richiardi, 2004).6  
In this chapter, we propose a model which embeds idiosyncratic stochastic 
influences in a simple imperfect information, rational expectations 
framework. We show that a right-skewed firms’ size distribution emerges as 
a natural feature of the endogenous cross-section dynamics, and that the 
upper tail is Pareto distributed. This results from the interplay of the cross-
sectional dispersion (i.e., heterogeneity) of firms and the feedback exerted on 
it by the competitive pressure that individual actions determine through the 
labour and the equity markets.7 Furthermore, certain properties of the steady-
state distribution are in some sense universal, i.e. they are independent of 
some of the model’s parameters. In other terms, our approach does not 
possess any tendency towards a long-run degenerate behaviour, typical of 
Gibrat’s processes, and it grants the modeller more degrees of freedom than 
the stochastic-game-theoretic models referred to above. From an analytical 
point of view, our results are based on the possibility of describing the 
economy as a Generalized Lotka-Volterra system, that is a multi-agent 
extension of the prey-predator framework formally introduced to economists 
by Richard M. Goodwin (1913-1996) back in the 1960s (Goodwin, 1967). While 
inside the Econophysics community such a formalism has been already 
successfully employed to explain puzzling statistical regularities regarding 
                                                 
5 Among the many variations of the Gibrat’s model, one can cite the preferential attachment 
mechanism introduced by Simon and Bonini (1958), the multiplicative plus additive random 
process due to Kesten (1973), or the lower reflection barrier by Levy and Solomon (1996). 
6 To grasp the argument, consider this simple example reported by Richiardi (2004). Let us 
presume that the size of a firm increases or decreases, with equal probability, by 10% in each 
period. Now suppose that, starting from a size of 1, the firm first shrinks and then bounces 
back. In the first period the firm’s size is 0.9, while in the second one it is only 0.99. If we let the 
dynamics be inverted, so that the firm first grows and then shrinks, then the firms’ size is 1.1 in 
the first period, and 0.99 in the second one. Clearly, this effect is stronger the bigger the 
variance of the stochastic growth process, and can be contrasted only by increasing the average 
growth rate. Richiardi (2004), resorting to simulations, shows that a degenerate long-run 
distribution can be prevented only by a limited number of mean/variance pairs. 
7 Another model in which financing constraints help to explain the skewness of the firms’ size 
distribution is the one recently proposed by Cabral and Mata (2003).    4
stock market returns and the personal wealth distribution (Solomon and 
Richmond, 2001), the application of this Generalized Lotka-Volterra approach 
to the relation between the firms’ size distribution and aggregate fluctuations 
is new.  
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 a simple 
macroeconomic model resting on financial market imperfections, maximizing 
behaviour, rational expectations and heterogeneity is presented. Section 3 
contains the characterization of the associated firms’ size cross-section 
dynamics and its long-run attractor or, in other terms, the equilibrium firms’ 
size distribution. Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. The model 
The purpose of this section is to create a simple macroeconomic model that, 
besides explaining aggregate fluctuations, replicates the main features of 
industrial dynamics and the firm size distribution. At the centre of our 
approach there are three basic ideas:  
i)  The firms’ financial position matters. Firms display heterogeneous 
unobservable characteristics, so that lenders may not be perfectly 
informed on firms’ ability or willingness to pay back. As a result, the 
various financial instruments whereby firms can raise means of 
payment are not perfect substitutes. Decisions about employment and 
production are conditional on the cost and contractual terms of the 
financial instruments available to firms (Gertler, 1988). From an 
empirical viewpoint, it appears that firms tend to be rationed on the 
market for equity due to both adverse selection and moral hazard 
effects (Fazzari et al., 1988).  
ii)  Agents are heterogeneous as regards how they perceive risk 
associated to economic decisions. Numerous experimental studies 
indicate that heterogeneity in risk p e r c e p t i o n  i s  p e r v a s i v e .  S u c h  a  
finding holds both for consumers and insurees (Hammar and 
Johansson-Stenman, 2004; Lundborg and Lindgren, 2002; Filkestein 
and Poterba, 2004), and for entrepreneurs (Pennings and Garcia, 2004; 
van Garderen et al., 2005). While popular in mathematical psychology, 
the exploitation of these findings is far less common in theoretical 
economics, the random utility model discussed in Anderson et al. 
(1992) being a relevant exception.    5
iii)  Firms interact through the labour and equity markets. While the 
feedbacks occurring in the labour market between hiring firms are 
clear enough not to deserve particular emphasis, a few words are in 
order to discuss interactions in the equity market. In particular, we are 
referring to the evidence suggesting that the number of initial public 
offerings (IPO), of additional new stock issues, as well as the 
proportion of external financing accounted for by private equity, all 
tend to increase as the aggregate activity expands and the equity 
market is bullish, and vice-versa (Choe et al., 1993; Brailsford et al., 
2000).  
All other aspects of the model are kept as simple as possible. 8 
We follow the literature on information imperfections in financial markets, 
in particular Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), in assuming that finitely many 
competitive firms indexed by i = 1,…, I operate in an uncertain environment, 
in which futures markets do not exist.9  
Each firm has a constant returns to scale technology which uses only 
labour as an input, yit = φnit, where yit is the time t output of firm i, nit its 
employment, and φ the labour productivity, constant and common to all. The 
production cycle takes one period regardless of the scale of output, implying 
that firms have to pay for inputs before being able to sell output.  
Since capital markets are characterized by informational imperfections, 
firms’ ability to raise risk capital on external stock markets is sub-optimal, 
and restricted to depend on the average capitalization in the economy. As a 
result, firms must generally rely upon bank loans to pay for production costs 
(i.e., the wage bill). In real terms the demand for credit of the i-th firm is dit = 
wtnit – ait, where wt is the real wage, determined on an aggregate labour 
market, while ait is the firm i’s real equity position. For simplicity we assume 
that firms can borrow from banks as much as they want at the market 
expected real return r, and debt is totally repaid in one period. 
The individual demand faced by firms is affected by idiosyncratic real 
shocks. The individual selling price of the i-th firm is the random outcome of 
a market process around the average market price of output Pt, according to 
the law Pit = uitPt, with expected value E(uit) = 1 and finite variance. Let the I 
                                                 
8 For a more complete, agent-based model where aggregate (mean-field) interactions occur 
through the credit market, see Delli Gatti et al. (2005). 
9 The analytical details of the framework used in this paper are discussed at length in Delli 
Gatti (1999).    6
random variables {ui} be uniformly, but non-identically, distributed. In 
particular, support of the i-th firm relative price shock uit is given by [zit, 2−zit], 
with {zi} ∈ (0,1) being a iid random variable with finite mean and variance. It 
follows that individual price shocks are characterized by a common and 
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stochastically. This aims to capture the idea that people usually perceive the 
same signal in different ways or, alternatively, that people differ as regards 
the degree of risk they attach to random events to be forecasted.  
If a firm cannot meet its debt obligations (in real terms, πit+1 < 0, where πit+1 
are real profits at the beginning of period t+1), it goes bankrupt. From the 
assumptions above, it follows that this event happens as the relative price is 
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where R = (1 + r). 
Going bankrupt is costly, not only because of direct legal and 
administrative costs (Altman, 1984; White, 1989), but also because of the 
indirect costs of bankruptcy-induced disruptions, like asset disappearance, 
loss of key employees and investment opportunities, and managerial stigma 
and loss of reputation (Gilson, 1990; Kaplan and Reishus, 1990). Estimates 
suggests that the costs associated to bankruptcy may be very large (White, 
1983; Weiss, 1990). For simplicity, we assume that the real bankruptcy cost Cit 
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where c > 0 is a measure of the aversion to bankruptcy on the part of the 
firm’s owners and managers. As recalled above, the magnitude of the 
parameter measuring aversion to bankruptcy depends on a number of 
factors, and it can vary with the institutional framework and the economic   7
conditions faced by firms. Clearly, the higher is c, the lower is the incentive to 
recur to debt in financing production and — as we will see presently — the 
lower is the level of output maximizing real profits.  
While the model could be expanded to more general cases with similar 
qualitative results - although at the cost of additional remarkable analytical 
complications – for the sake of tractability we limit the dynamics of the 
system in a region in which the two following conditions holds true:  
C1: The individual demand for credit is always positive, i.e. di > 0, ∀ i. 
C2: Expected profits net of expected bankruptcy costs are always positive, 




The problem of firm i consists in maximizing the expected value of real 
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From the first order condition it follows that as c grows large10 the 
individual supply can be approximated to the linear function: 
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where hit, being a function of the random variable zit, is a random variable as 
well, which we assume follows a distribution Π(hi) with finite mean and 
variance. Individual supply is an increasing linear function of net worth, as a 
                                                 




























 tends to approach 0. It seem worthwhile to note that 
this could happen well before c goes to infinity, since both terms at the numerator are lower 
than 1. In particular, for c ≤ 10,000 the expression above becomes lower than 0.01 but for a 
negligible number of cases.     8
higher net worth reduces the marginal bankruptcy costs. In turn, for any 
given level of net worth higher uncertainty (a realization of the random 
variable zit close to 0) on the relative price makes production more risky. As 
firms trying to maximize the concave profit function (3) behaves in a risk-
averse manner, higher uncertainty means lower production. 
The dynamics of production can be tracked by the evolution of the equity 
base, which in real terms reads as: 
 
    ( ) t i it it t it it it a a n w R y u a γ + − − = +1       (5) 
 
where  t a  is the average capitalization of firms operating at time t, and γi > 0. 
The last term measures the amount of new equity firm i can raise on the stock 
market, assumed to be proportional to the average capitalization of the 
economy at time t. The value of γi depends on the level of development of the 
financial system, that is on the presence of financial instruments, markets and 
institutions aimed at mitigating the effects of information and transaction 
costs. Firms operating in economies with larger, more active and more liquid 
stock markets with a large number of private equity funds are characterized 
by a higher γ than economies with poorly developed financial systems. From 
the point of view of each individual firm, however, the hot market effect 
represents an externality arising from a mean-field interaction.  
Finally, we assume that at any time t the real wage is determined on the 
labour market according to an aggregate wage setting function, which for 
simplicity we assume to be linear: 
 
          wt = bnt      ( 6 )  
 
where nt is total employment, and b > 0. Such a positive relationship between 
aggregate employment (at given labour supply) and real wage can be 
alternatively derived from union models, insider-outsider models or 
efficiency wage models (Lindbeck, 1992). 
The parameters γi and b then capture the interdependence between 
aggregate outcomes on the financial and the labour markets, respectively, and 
individual decisions. Their values vary with the institutional context 
governing both market transactions and non-market interactions. Such an 
institutionally-constrained microeconomic analysis calls for the search of 
appropriate macrofoundations of microeconomics (Colander, 1996). The 
importance of this issue will be further discussed below.      9
Due to the constant returns technology and the supply function (4), 
knowledge of ait immediately translates into knowledge, at least in 
expectational terms, of other traditional measures of firms’ size, that is total 
sales (yit) and employment (nit). By inserting (4) and (6) into (5), and assuming 
rational expectations so that uit = 1 for any i and t, we obtain: 
 
      ait+1 = (hit + R)ait + t ia γ − Rbntnit.    (7) 
 
Heterogeneity enters the model along two margins. First, because of 
cumulative differences in individual equity bases, which are influenced by 
past idiosyncratic shocks to relative prices. Second, because of differences in 
the way agents perceive risk associated to future profits. The dynamical 
system (7) for i ∈ (1, I) and its predictions for the firms’ size distribution will 
be analyzed in the next Section.  
For the time being we just want to highlight that this economy can display 
aggregate — i.e., per capita —endogenous fluctuations under rather mild 
conditions. To do this, let us take the cross-sectional average in both members 
of (7) to get:  
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where to simplify calculations we have assumed that the real shock to 
individual aggregate demand is always equal to its average value, so that 








= , allows us to show that equation (8) can be reduced to a 
logistic map (Iooss, 1979): 
 
    ( ) t t t x x x − Γ = + 1 1 .     (9) 
 
where  γ + + = Γ R ht t  is the control parameter. It is well known that such a 
first-order nonlinear map can display deterministic cycles if 3 < Γ < 3.57, and 
non-periodic — i.e., chaotic — behaviour if  3.57 < Γ < 4 (Baumol and 
Benhabib, 1989). In this latter case, the time series generated by the one-  10
dimensional deterministic difference equation (9) are characterized by 
irregular fluctuations which can mimic actual data. In particular, the dynamic 
path of the economy enter a chaotic regions for particular combinations of the 
average slope of the individual offer functions (itself parameterized by the 
interest rate and the real product wage), of the interest rate on loans, and of 
the parameter measuring spillovers in the equity market. 
The literature modelling endogenous business fluctuations in terms of 
non-linear dynamic systems and chaotic attractors is large. See Day (1996) for 
a nice introduction to methods and applications. In frameworks strictly 
related to the one we employ here, Gallegati (1994) shows how to derive 
sudden shifts between the periodic and non-periodic regimes due to 
stochastic influences on the tuning parameter, while Delli Gatti and Gallegati 
(1996) introduce technological progress to obtain fluctuating growth.   
 
3. The firms’ size distribution 
This Section is devoted to analyzing the cross-section dynamics associated to 
system (7), which amounts to studying the firms’ size distribution and its 
evolution. A natural question is whether such a distribution converges 
towards a long-run stable (i.e., invariant) distribution, or if it is bound to 
fluctuate in a random-like manner.  
It must be stressed from the start that the aggregate dynamics generated 
by the aggregate model (8)-(9) resembles the Richard Goodwin’s prey-
predator growth-cycle model (Goodwin, 1967), which represents the first 
attempt to adapt the mathematical description of biological evolution due to 
Alfred Lotka and Vito Volterra to an investigation of the way a modern 
economy works. In this masterpiece of non-linear economic dynamics, 
Goodwin re-cast in a new, analytically elegant guise11 the Marxian analysis of 
capitalism and its inherent instability. The two classes of capitalist and 
workers compete for the national income, which at any time period is divided 
between profits and wages according to their relative strength. During an 
expansion phase, growing investment opportunities call for an increasing 
demand for labour. Rising wages and rising employment, in turn, determine 
an increase in the share of national income going to workers. As the profit 
                                                 
11 The Nobel Laureate Robert Solow used the following words to comment the 1967   
Goodwin’s paper: “[It] is five pages long. It does its business clearly and forcefully and stops. It 
contains no empty calories” (Veluppillai, 1990, p.34).   11
share declines, however, gross investments - and therefore total output - fall. 
As a result, new job creation shrinks and the unemployed labour force (the 
so-called  reserve army of the unemployed) is enlarged. The growth in the 
unemployed puts downward competitive pressure on wages, and thus 
provides greater profit opportunities. Larger profits stimulates additional 
capital accumulation, and economic activity and labour demand increase. The 
business cycle can begin again. 
The story we are telling is basically the same as the Goodwin’s one. During 
an upswing, the increase of output induces higher profits and more private 
equity funds. Higher production means also rising employment and higher 
wages, however. The increased wage bill calls for more bank loans which, 
when repaid, will depress profits and, through equations (4) and (5), the 
production and the equity level as well. The labour requirement thus 
decreases, along with the real wage, while profits rise. This restores 
profitability and the cycle can start again. 
Moving from an aggregate to a cross sectional perspective, it seems 
worthwhile to stress that the predator-prey analogy can be extended to the 
non-linear dynamical system (7), as it represents a Generalized Lotka-Volterra 
(GLV) system (Solomon, 2000), whose solution  describes the limit (long-run) 
behaviour of the firms’ size distribution as measured by their equity, 
employment or sales. Such a system is completely defined by: i) a stochastic 
autocatalytic term representing production and how it impacts on equity; ii) a 
drift term representing the influence played − via the hot market effect − by 
aggregate capitalization on the financial position of each firm; and iii) a time 
dependent saturation term capturing the competitive pressure exerted by the 
labour market.  
In what follows we will borrow from the work of Solomon and Richmond 
(2001), to show that the cross sectional predictions of the GLV system (7) are 
consistent with the available empirical evidence on how firms are distributed. 
In particular, the right tail of the firms’ size distribution turns out to exhibit a 
Pareto distribution of the form: 
 
                  ( ) a P ∼
α − −1 a      ( 1 0 )  
 
over several orders of magnitude. Interesting enough, the GLV model ensures 
a stable exponent α even in the presence of large fluctuations of the terms 
parameterizing the economy, namely the random equity productivity term h 
and the aggregate employment level n.    12
To see how this result can be obtained, we transform the system (7) from 
discrete to continuous time to write the time evolution of the equity base of 
firm i as: 
 
    () ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) t a t a t a t a t t a t a t da t i i i i i i , 1 δ γ β τ − + − = − + =    (11) 
 






δ = . 
To ensure the limit τ → ∞ to be meaningful, let γi(t),  ( ) t a, δ  and the time 
averages  () 1 − = t s i β  - equal for all i - to be of order τ. Let us define the 
variance of the random terms β: 
 
         
2 2 2 β β σ − = i  ∼  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2 2
t i i ε β β = −    (12) 
 
where  () () β β ε − = t t i i  represents the stochastic fluctuations of the 
autocatalytic term. Without any loss of generality, we assume  () 0 = t i ε . 
Note that β i(t) – 1 = ε i(t) + s, so we can write: 
 
       () ( ) [] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) t a t a t a t a s t t da i i i i i , δ γ ε − + + = .   (13) 
 





i = ϕ , which represents the 
relative equity of the i-th firm, and apply the chain rule for differentials, we 
obtain: 
 
            ( ) ( ) [ ] i i i i i t t d γ ϕ γ ε ϕ + − = .    (14) 
 
The system (14) shows that the stochastic dynamics of the relative equity 
base and, due to the linearity assumptions, of the relative sales and 
employment as well, reduces to a set of independent, linear equations. If we 
assume that the variance of the uncertainty associated to the relative price is 
common to all, so that 
2 2 σ σ = i , and the same is true for the hot market   13
influence on individual equity,  γ γ = i , we obtain (Solomon and Richmond, 
2001): 
 


























= . Above ϕ0, that is on its upper tail, it behaves like a power law 
with scaling exponent α, while below ϕ0 it vanishes very fast.  
The theoretical value of the scaling exponent α is bounded from below to 
1,12 it increases with γ and it decreases with σ2. In other terms, α depends 
exclusively on: i) how much firms are rationed in issuing new risk capital or, 
in other terms, on how much capital markets are affected by adverse selection 
and moral hazard phenomena; ii) how much individuals are heterogeneous 
as regards the perceived risk associated to their final demand. Given that both 
the degree with which these two factors bites and the array of institutions set 
up to confront them differ widely among countries, besides predicting that 
the firms’ size distribution scales down as a power law, our model suggests 
that the degree of industrial concentration should be country-specific.13   
Both the shape of the distribution P(ϕ) - and therefore of P(a), P(y) and P(n) 
- and the heterogeneity of scaling among countries are consistent with the 
empirical evidence. Axtell (2001) reports estimates for the whole universe of 
the U.S. firms as derived from the Census of Manufactures, suggesting that 
the firms’ size distribution is Pareto distributed with α = 1. Other studies 
concentrate on large firms in international samples, largely confirming 
Axtell’s results. Gaffeo et al. (2003), for instance, show that the upper tail of 
the firms’ size distribution as derived for a pool of quoted large companies 
from the G7 countries is Pareto, and that the scaling exponent is comprised 
between 1 (total sales) and 1.15 (total assets) as one changes the proxy used to 
                                                 
12 The case α = 1 is also known as the Zipf’s law. 
13 Naldi (2003) derives analytical relationships between the scaling exponent of a power law 
distribution and several major concentration indices, like the Hirschman-Herfindahl  and the 
Gini indices.   14
measure the firms’ size. Ramsden and Kiss-Haypál (2000), furthermore, 
provide evidence on the larger firms for a sample of 20 countries: for 16 of 
them, the firms’ size distribution scales as a power law with α comprised 
between 1 and 1.25.14  
Interestingly enough, α does not directly depend on how firms interact in 
the labour market, which can thus be modelled recurring to alternative 
assumptions without affecting the shape of the long run firms’ size 
distribution. To put it in another way, our model suggests that a necessary 
condition for the firms’ size to evolve towards a power law distribution is to 
let firms’ decisions be affected by competitive pressures from the labour 
market, but also that the shape of the distribution is invariant to details. In 
particular, it is invariant to the precise form of the relation between wages 
and unemployment, to the way the productivity dynamics or fiscal variables  
affect it, and consequently to the level of the natural rate of unemployment.  
Furthermore, our model does not possess the degenerative asymptotic 
behaviour affecting both the basic Gibrat’s model and its numerous 
extensions, that is a long run dynamics which implodes or explodes but for a 
tiny (and empirically implausible) set of values of the average stochastic 
multiplicative shock. In particular, the industrial dynamics evolves towards a 
stable distribution with a Pareto-Levy upper tail even if the dynamics of the 
equity productivity term h is nonstationary, or the parameter b summarizing 
how the labour market works is subject to sudden, large shifts.  
Finally, it is worthwhile to note that the parameter γ — a proxy for the 
level of development of capital markets — tunes at the same time the 
dynamic features of aggregate fluctuations and the longitudinal 
characteristics of microeconomic units. Suppose γ is initially at a low value. 
The design and implementation of new financial regulations abating moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems, or the emergence of market-based 
financial innovations aimed at easing risk diversification, translate into an 
easier access to new equity financing: γ increases for all firms, regardless of 
their leverage position. Ceteris paribus, this results in a more egalitarian 
distribution of firms’ size (a higher α), due to higher positive externalities in 
external finance. The increase of γ, in turn, causes an increase of the control 
parameter of the logistic map Γ, which may move the system’s aggregate (i.e., 
per-capita) dynamics from, say, a periodic oscillation (limit cycle) regime to a 
                                                 
14 The exceptions are China (α = 0.83; data referred to 1993), Hungary (α = 0.71; data referred to 
1992), South-Africa (α = 2.27; data referred to 1994) and U.S.A. (α = 0.8; data referred to 1994).    15
chaotic one. In our model, reducing the inequality of access to investment 
opportunities may be a necessary condition for an increase in macroeconomic 
volatility. The intuition for this result is straightforward. A higher γ implies 
more powerful spillovers stemming from average capitalization towards 
individual laws of motion for equity. Higher individual equity bases, 
however, cause firms to demand more labour and, due to condition C1, to 
more debt. A higher labour demand, in turn, implies a higher real wage 
which drives towards lower profits. From an analytical viewpoint, as 
spillovers raise the curvature of the logistic map (9) increases, and the per-
capita dynamics crosses several bifurcations migrating from a stable regime 
to a chaotic one.  
Incidentally, our findings lend some theoretical support to the argument 
put forth by authoritative commentators (see e.g. ECB, 2007), according to 
whom the spurt of volatility occurred in international markets during the 
summer of 2007 has been partly due to the rising leverage of the corporate 
sector associated to the massive increase of private equity-sponsored 
leveraged buyout deals occurred since 2003.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The relation among the firms’ size and growth rates, their longitudinal 
distribution and macroeconomic activity represents an issue of major 
importance for the economic profession as a whole. A proper understanding 
of why firms grow (or do not grow) and how they distribute in the long-run 
may help in understanding whether microeconomic constraints are important 
for macroeconomic growth (Kumar at al., 2001). Furthermore, realizing that 
firms respond differently − and, in particular, assessing how different their 
responses are − to the business cycle may help in designing policies to reduce 
firms’ vulnerability (Higson et al., 2004) or to foster job creation at an 
aggregate level (Hart and Oulton, 2001). 
In this chapter we show how heterogeneity in the firms’ financial position 
and the competitive pressure exerted by their indirect interactions on the 
labour and the equity markets can combine to explain both macroeconomic 
fluctuations and the cross-sectional distribution of microeconomic variables. 
In particular, a key stylized fact established by empirical studies on 
longitudinal firm data − the firms’ size distribution is right-skewed, and its 
upper tail scales as a power law − can be interpreted in terms of a stable, 
steady-state statistical equilibrium associated to microeconomic dynamics in a   16
maximizing, rational expectations model. Our findings suggest that the 
degree of long-run heterogeneity, measured by the scaling exponent 
characterizing the right tail of the firms’ size distribution, depends on 
institutional factors, i.e. how financial markets work, and the degree of 
uncertainty affecting economic agents.  
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